Abstract. In this contribution, the vulnerabilities of iris-based recognition systems to direct attacks are studied. A database of fake iris images has been created from real iris of the BioSec baseline database. Iris images are printed using a commercial printer and then, presented at the iris sensor. We use for our experiments a publicly available iris recognition system, which some modifications to improve the iris segmentation step. Based on results achieved on different operational scenarios, we show that the system is vulnerable to direct attacks, pointing out the importance of having countermeasures against this type of fraudulent actions.
Introduction
The increasing interest on biometrics is related to the number of important applications where a correct assessment of identity is a crucial point. The term biometrics refers to automatic recognition of an individual based on anatomical (e.g., fingerprint, face, iris, hand geometry, ear, palmprint) or behavioral characteristics (e.g., signature, gait, keystroke dynamics) [1] . Biometric systems have several advantages over traditional security methods based on something that you know (password, PIN) or something that you have (card, key, etc.). In biometric systems, users do not need to remember passwords or PINs (which can be forgotten) or to carry cards or keys (which can be stolen). Among all biometric techniques, iris recognition has been traditionally regarded as one of the most reliable and accurate biometric identification system available [2] . Additionally, the iris is highly stable over a person's lifetime and lends itself to noninvasive identification because it is an externally visible internal organ [3] .
However, in spite of these advantages, biometric systems have some drawbacks [4] : i) the lack of secrecy (e.g. everybody knows our face or could get our fingerprints), and ii) the fact that a biometric trait can not be replaced (if we forget a password we can easily generate a new one, but no new fingerprint can be generated if an impostor "steals" it). Moreover, biometric systems are vulnerable to external attacks which could decrease their level of security. In [5] Ratha et al. identified and classified eight possible attack points to biometric recognition systems. These vulnerability points, depicted in Figure 1 , can broadly be divided into two main groups: Fig. 1 . Architecture of an automated biometric verification system. Possible attack points are numbered from 1 to 8.
-Direct attacks. Here, the sensor is attacked using synthetic biometric samples, e.g. gummy fingers (point 1 in Figure 1 ). It is worth noting that in this type of attacks no specific knowledge about the system is needed. Furthermore, the attack is carried out in the analog domain, outside the digital limits of the system, so digital protection mechanisms (digital signature, watermarking, etc) cannot be used.
-Indirect attacks. This group includes all the remaining seven points of attack identified in Figure 1 . Attacks 3 and 5 might be carried out using a Trojan Horse that bypasses the system modules. In attack 6, the system database is manipulated. The remaining points of attack (2, 4, 7 and 8) exploit possible weak points in the communication channels of the system. In opposition to direct attacks, in this case the intruder needs to have some additional information about the internal working of the system and, in most cases, physical access to some of the application components. Most of the works reporting indirect attacks use some type of variant of the hill climbing technique introduced in [6] .
In this work we concentrate our efforts in studying direct attacks on iris-based verification systems. For this purpose we have built a database with synthetic iris images generated from 50 users of the BioSec multi-modal baseline corpus [7] . This paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 we detail the process followed for the creation of the fake iris, and the database used in the experiments is presented. The experimental protocol, some results and further discussion are reported in Sect. 3. Conclusions are finally drawn in Sect. 4.
Fake Iris Database
A new iris database has been created using iris images from 50 users of the BioSec baseline database [7] . The process is divided into three steps: i) first original images are preprocessed for a better afterwards quality, then ii) they are printed on a piece of paper using a commercial printer as shown in Figure 2 (left), and lastly, iii) printed images are presented at the iris sensor, as can be seen in Figure 2 (right), obtaining the fake image.
Fake Iris Generation Method
To correctly create a new database, it is necessary to take into account factors affecting the quality of acquired fake images. The main variables with significant importance for iris quality are found to be: preprocessing of original images, printer type and paper type.
We tested two different printers: a HP Deskjet 970cxi (inkjet printer) and a HP LaserJet 4200L (laser printer). They both give fairly good quality. On the other hand, we observed that the quality of acquired fake images depends on the type of paper used. Here comes the biggest range of options. All the tested types appear in Table 1 . In our experiments, the preprocessing is specially important since it has been observed that the iris camera does not capture original images printed without previous modifications. Therefore we have tested different enhancement methods before printing in order to acquire good quality fake images. The options tested are also summarized in Table 1 . By analyzing all the possibilities with a small set of images, the combination that gives the best segmentation results and therefore the best quality for the afterwards comparison has been found to be the inkjet printer, with high resolution paper and an Open-TopHat preprocessing step. In Figure 3 , examples using different preprocessing techniques with this kind of paper and inkjet printer are shown.
Database
The fake iris database follows the same structure of the original BioSec database. Therefore, data for the experiments consists of 50 users × 2 eyes × 4 images × 2 sessions = 800 fake iris images, and its corresponding real images. Acquisition of fake images has been carried out with the same iris camera used in BioSec, a LG IrisAccess EOU3000.
Experiments

Recognition System
We have used for our experiments the iris recognition system 1 developed by Libor Masek [9] . It consists of the following sequence of steps that are described next: segmentation, normalization, encoding and matching.
For iris segmentation, the system uses a circular Hough transform in order to detect the iris and pupil boundaries. Iris boundaries are modeled as two circles. The system also performs an eyelids removal step. Eyelids are isolated first by fitting a line to the upper and lower eyelid using a linear Hough transform (see Figure 4 (a) right, in which the eyelid lines correspond to the border of the black blocks). Eyelashes detection by histogram thresholding is available in the source code, but it is not performed in our experiments. Although eyelashes are quite dark compared with the surrounding iris region, other iris areas are equally dark due to the imaging conditions. Therefore, thresholding to isolate eyelashes would also remove important iris regions. However, eyelash occlusion has been found to be not very prominent in our database.
To improve the performance of this segmentation procedure, we pre-estimate the iris centroid by histogram thresholding, since iris region is observed to have the lowest gray levels of an iris image. This pre-estimation allows to reduce the searching area of the circular Hough transform. Also, we impose three conditions to the two circles that model iris and pupil boundaries: i) although these two circles are known to be non-concentric, a maximum value is imposed to the distance among their centers; ii) the two circles are not allowed to to have parts outside the iris image; and iii) the radius of the two circles are not allowed to be similar.
Normalization of iris regions is performed using a technique based on Daugman's rubber sheet model [10] . The center of the pupil is considered as the reference point, based on which a 2D array is generated consisting of an angular-radial mapping of the segmented iris region. In Figure 4 , an example of the normalization step is depicted.
Feature encoding is implemented by convolving the normalized iris pattern with 1D Log-Gabor wavelets. The rows of the 2D normalized pattern are taken as the 1D signal, each row corresponding to a circular ring on the iris region. It uses the angular direction since maximum independence occurs in this direction. The filtered output is then phase quantized to four levels using the Daugman method [10] , with each filtering producing two bits of data. The output of phase quantization is a grey code, so that when going from one quadrant to another, only 1 bit changes. This will minimize the number of bits disagreeing, if say two intra-class patterns are slightly misaligned and thus will provide more accurate recognition [9] . The encoding process produces a binary template and a corresponding noise mask which represents the eyelids areas (see Figure 4 (c) ).
For matching, the Hamming distance is chosen as a metric for recognition. The Hamming distance employed incorporates the noise mask, so that only significant bits are used in calculating the Hamming distance between two iris templates. The modified Hamming distance formula is given by
where X j and Y j are the two bitwise templates to compare, Xn j and Y n j are the corresponding noise masks for X j and Y j , and N is the number of bits represented by each template.
In order to account for rotational inconsistencies, when the Hamming distance of two templates is calculated, one template is shifted left and right bitwise and a number of Hamming distance values are calculated from successive shifts [10] . This method corrects for misalignments in the normalized iris pattern caused by rotational differences during imaging. From the calculated distance values, the lowest one is taken.
Experimental Protocol
For the experiments, each eye in the database is considered as a different user. In this way, we have two sessions with 4 images each for 100 users (50 donors × 2 eyes per donor).
Two different attack scenarios are considered in the experiments and compared to the system normal operation mode: -Normal Operation Mode (NOM): both the enrollment and the test are carried out with a real iris. This is used as the reference scenario. In this context the FAR (False Acceptance Rate) of the system is defined as the number of times an impostor using his own iris gains access to the system as a genuine user, which can be understood as the robustness of the system against a zero-effort attack. The same way, the FRR (False Rejection Rate) denotes the number of times a genuine user is rejected by the system.
-Attack 1: both the enrollment and the test are carried out with a fake iris. In this case the attacker enrolls to the system with the fake iris of a genuine user and then tries to access the application also with a fake iris of the same user. In this scenario an attack is unsuccessful (i.e. the system repels the attack) when the impostor is not able to access the system using the fake iris. Thus, the attack success rate (SR) in this scenario can be computed as:
-Attack 2: the enrollment is performed using a real iris, and tests are carried out with fake iris. In this case the genuine user enrolls with his/her iris and the attacker tries to access the application with the fake iris of the legal user. A successful attack is accomplished when the system confuses a fake iris with its corresponding genuine iris, i.e., SR = FAR.
In order to compute the performance of the system in the normal operation mode, the experimental protocol is as follows. For a given user, all the images of the first session are considered as enrolment templates. Genuine matchings are obtained by comparing the templates to the corresponding images of the second session from the same user. Impostor matchings are obtained by comparing one randomly selected template of a user to a randomly selected iris image of the second session from the remaining users. Similarly, to compute the FRR in attack 1, all the fake images of the first session of each user are compared with the corresponding fake images of the second session. In the attack 2 scenario, only the impostor scores are computed matching all the 4 original samples of each user with its 4 fake samples of the second session. In our experiments, not all the images were segmented successfully by the recognition system. As a result, it was not possible to use all the eye images for testing experiments.
Results
In Figure 5 , several examples of fake images with correct and incorrect iris detection are plotted. The number of correctly segmented images are 792 for the original database (99% of the 800 available) and 574 for the fake database (71.75% of the 800). It is worth noting than more than 70% of fake images pass through the segmentation and normalization stages, and they are input into the feature extraction and matching stages. Thanks to the modifications included in the segmentation stage (see Section 3.1), we have improved the segmentation rate of the original system, which in our preliminary experiments was 80.56% and 38.43% for the original and fake database, respectively. It is important to consider that as we try to improve the segmentation rate of true iris images, we are also improving the segmentation rate of fake images. In Table 2 we show the Success Rate (SR) of the direct attacks against the recognition system at four different operating points, considering only the matchings between correctly segmented images. The decision threshold is fixed to reach a FAR={0.1, 1, 2, 5} % in the normal operation mode (NOM), and then the success rate of the two proposed attacks is computed. We observe that in all the operating points, the system is vulnerable to the two attacks (i.e. a success rate of about 35% or higher is observed). This is specially evident as the FAR in the normal operation mode is increased, being successful more than half of the attacks. It is also remarkable the high success rates observed for attack 1, which are quite similar to attack 2. In the attack 1, an intruder would be correctly enrolled in the system using a fake image of another person and at a later date, he/she would be granted access to the system also using a fake image.
Conclusion
An evaluation of the vulnerabilities to direct attacks of iris-based verification systems has been presented. The attacks have been evaluated using fake iris images created from real iris of the BioSec baseline database. We printed iris images with a commercial printer and then, we presented the images to the iris sensor. Different factors affecting the quality of acquired fake images have been studied, including preprocessing of original images, printer type and paper type. We have chosen the combination giving the best quality and then, we have built a database of fake images from 100 eyes, with 8 iris images per eye. Acquisition of fake images has been carried out with the same iris camera used in BioSec.
Two attack scenarios have been compared to the normal operation mode of the system using a publicly available iris recognition system. The first attack scenario considers enrolling to the system and accessing it with fake iris. The second one represents accessing a genuine account with fake iris. Results showed that the system is vulnerable to the two evaluated attacks. We also observed that about 72% of the fake images were correctly segmented by the system. When that this happens, the intruder is granted access with high probability, reaching the success rate of the two attacks a 50% or higher.
Liveness detection procedures are possible countermeasures against direct attacks. For the case of iris recognition systems, light reflections or behavioral features like eye movement, pupil response to a sudden lighting event, etc. have been proposed [11, 12] . This research direction will be the source of future work. We will also explore the use of another type of iris sensors, as the OKI's handheld iris sensor used in the CASIA database 2 .
